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TRANSPARENT VERIDICALITY AND 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL IMPOSTERS: 
THE TELLING ISSUE 
Robert Oakes 
Can there be veridical states of "mystical-union" such that their being 
veridical would be transparent to their phenomenological subjects? 
Epistemologists of religious belief have generally greeted this extraordi-
nary thesis with much disdain. The aim of this essay is to establish that the 
Doctrine of Transparent Veridicality (the DTV) is eminently (if surprisingly) 
defensible. Central to our argument for its tenability is a nontraditional and 
much-neglected conception of "mystical union." I hope to establish that no 
veridical state of mystical union-according to the relevant conception-
could conceivably be nonveridical or have a phenomenological imposter, and, 
accordingly, that the veridicality of any such mystical state can plausibly be 
regarded as transparent to its phenomenological subject. Thus, our conclu-
sion is that the DTV is rationally respectable. 
Mysticism is an eruption of the absolute into history. Like music, it is the crown-
ing of culture, its ultimate justification. 
- (E.M. Cioran, Tears and Saints) 
I 
In one of his classical works on mystical theology,t Thomas Merton main-
tains that nothing other than God 
can produce even a plausible imitation of true mystical union. 
Imitations are of course foisted upon souls, and sometimes with great 
success. But...anyone who has experienced true mystical union can 
see at once the infinite distance that lies between it and the false arti-
cle ... 
Thus, Merton embraces the intriguingly audacious-not to say radical-
doctrine that there can be mystical (nonsensory, "transcendental") percep-
tions2 of God's Presence the veridicality of which would be immediately 
apparent to their respective phenomenological subjects, i.e., to their respec-
tive phenomenological subjects who are rational and attentive. More 
specifically and more strongly, Merton maintains that, with respect to true 
mystical union (to borrow his expression), no perception of that sort could 
fail to be such that its veridicality would be immediately apparent to its 
phenomenological subject. Let us call this "the Doctrine of Transparent 
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Veridicality" (the "DTV"). 
While what may broadly be called the "religious experience argument" 
for the existence of God has been defended with remarkable adroitness in 
recent years,3 epistemologists of religious belief-many of whom are the-
ists, of course-have generally been disdainful of the notion that there can 
be veridical mystical states such that their being veridical rather than deceptive 
(or nonveridical) would be immediately apparent to their phenomenological 
subjects.4 Analytic philosophers of religion have, for the vast most part, 
been conspicuously unsympathetic to (any version of) the DTV. 
My aim in what follows is to demonstrate that the DTV-however sur-
prising or counterintuitive many may take this to be-is amenable to 
philosophical vindication.5 This is hardly to suggest anything so quixotic as 
that our argument to be elaborated can properly be taken to entail the truth 
of the DTV. Nonetheless, the thesis I am out to defend is not exactly mod-
est. That is, the conclusion I shall be working towards is that the DTV is not 
just a doctrine for which there is concephlal space within the epistemology of 
religious experience, but, more strongly, is a doctrine that is rationally 
respectable. Specifically, I hope to establish the defensibility of the following: 
any veridical state of mystical union would be such that its veridicality was 
transparent to its phenomenological subject. As will be seen, a defense of a 
nontraditional-and, as it seems to me, unjustly under-developed or 
improperly ignored-theory of mystical union constitutes a key compo-
nent of our overall argument. First, however, we need to attend to the 
abiding and seemingly intractable question of how to tell the difference 
between veridical perceptual states and deceptive perceptual states. 
II 
How are we able to tell, concerning any of our perceptual states, that it is in 
fact veridical rather than deceptive, i.e., that it actually reveals what it osten-
sibly reveals? When this question is considered from a rigorous or strictly 
philosophical "point of view," the appeal of classical perceptual skepticism 
is hardly mysterious. Consider: I am perfectly confident of being able to tell 
that there is presently an olive on the kitchen floor: that my relevant senso-
ry state reveals to me that this is so. Accordingly, I am perfectly confident 
that the perceptual state in question is veridical. However, to allow for the 
moment that this sensory state is veridical, it seems critically important to 
discriminate between my ability to "tell" in the ordinary or prosaic sense--
in the sense of for all practical purposes--that there is presently an olive on 
the kitchen floor and my ability to tell in the epistemically definitive or 
infallible sense that this state of affairs obtains. While it seems proper to 
maintain that I am able to "tell" in the prosaic sense that there is an olive on 
the kitchen floor, the view that I am able to tell infallibly that this is so, i.e., 
that my warrant for accepting this proposition is infallible, seems very diffi-
cult to defend. However, the philosophically rigorous conception of knowl-
edge requires my inability to know that there is an olive on the kitchen floor 
unless I can tell infallibly that this state of affairs obtains. As pointed out by 
Barry Stroud/ 
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Why do we find it so natural when philosophizing to hold that in order 
to know or to be certain of something we must know or be certain 
that no conceivable possibilities obtain which are such that, if they 
obtain then we do not know what we thought we did ... ? We do not 
in fact insist on that in everyday life, even in important scientific or 
legal matters; so why do find it so obvious when we think philosoph-
ically about human knowledge? 
Along this very line, David Lewis7 contends that, notwithstanding every-
day contexts in which we take it to be unproblematic that we know a great 
deal, the Skeptical Argument has considerable merit: 
It seems as if knowledge must be by definition infallible. If you claim 
that S knows that p, and yet you grant that S cannot eliminate a cer-
tain possibility in which [-p], it certainly seems as if you have grant-
ed that S does not after all know that p. To speak of fallible knowl-
edge, of knowledge despite uneliminated possibilities of error, just 
sounds contradictory. 
It seems to me that there is considerable insight in these reflections on 
knowledge and infallibilism. To begin with, it seems analytically undeni-
able that it cannot be epistemically definitive for S that p if S's warrant for 
accepting p is consistent with the truth of -po Hence, if Lewis is correct in 
maintaining that the notion of "fallible knowledge" gives profound indica-
tion of being conceptually disordered, then, unless we are able to tell infalli-
bly that our perceptual states--()r at least some of them-are veridical, the 
best that they can provide us with is reasonable belief not "fallible" knowl-
edge. It seems to me that Lewis is exactly right to call into question the con-
ceptual propriety of the idea of "fallible knowledge," and, accordingly, that 
the bifurcation sometimes made between knowing simpliciter and knowing 
for certain constitutes a "distinction without a difference."R (Here, of course, 
the salient cases are those wherein the accepted proposition meets the 
truth-condition for knowing, i.e., wherein p is true. There is obviously no 
possibility of fallible knowledge in any case in which p is false.) 
However, since it is largely extraneous to our central concern, we need 
not devote further space to the issue-albeit interesting and significant--()f 
whether there can be bona fide knowledge in the absence of infallible war-
rant. Rather, the question of moment is clearly this: can there be perceptual 
states-whether sensory or mystical-such that that their phenomenologi-
cal subjects would be able to tell infallibly that they are veridical? If there is 
persuasive reason for holding that the answer to this question is No, i.e., 
that we are limited to being able to tell that our veridical perceptual states 
are veridical only in the prosaic sense of being able to tell that they are for 
all practical purposes, then, of course, there is persuasive reason for main-
taining that there cannot be perceptual states-sensory or mystical-the 
veridicality of which would be transparent to their phenomenological sub-
jects. Hence, we need now to tum our attention to a postulate that has long 
been embraced by a significant majority of epistemologists of perception, 
and which, if true, spells very serious trouble for the DTV. It can properly 
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be called "the Phenomenological Indiscernibility Postulate" (the "PIP"). 
III 
According to the PIP, any perceptual state that is actually veridical is con-
ceivably deceptive. Accordingly, no veridical perceptual state could be such 
that its veridicality was entailed by its phenomenological content, i.e., any 
perceptual state that is veridical could be precisely the perceptual state that 
it is and be deceptive. Thus, a requirement of the PIP is that veridicality can 
never constitute an intrinsic property of a veridical perceptual state. 
William Alston endorses the PIP as follows:9 
Delusory experiences can be phenomenologically indistinguishable 
from veridical ones, in the mystical realm as well as the sensory. 
Richard Gale renders it this way:lO 
Certainly the very same phenomenological-intentional state that is 
realized in a veridical mystical state could be realized in an unveridi-
cal one. 
Hence, the PIP requires that there is no such thing as a perceptual state that 
is in fact veridical but lacks a phenomenological imposter. For example, allow-
ing that my sensory state consisting in (roughly) "olive-now-on-the-
kitchen-floor" is actually veridical, its phenomenological imposter would 
be a deceptive perceptual state that is phenomenologically identical to this 
veridical perceptual state. 
Accordingly, the PIP spells very bad news for the DTV since it surely 
precludes our ability to tell infallibly that any perceptual state of ours is in 
fact veridical. Consider: even allowing that the perceptual state which I 
take to reveal to me the presence of an olive on the kitchen floor is veridical, 
it could nonetheless-according to the PIP-have precisely the phenomeno-
logical character that it does and be deceptive, i.e., have precisely the phe-
nomenological character that it does and constitute a phenomenological 
imposter. In which case, of course, it would fail to reveal to me the presence 
of an olive on the kitchen floor. Accordingly, this veridical perceptual state 
can hardly provide me with epistemically definitive foundation for believ-
ing that there is presently an olive on the kitchen floor.l] Thus, it seems 
abundantly clear that-mystical states being perceptual states-there can 
be no veridical mystical states the veridicality of which would be transparent 
to their phenomenological subjects unless there can be veridical mystical 
states to which the PIP would not apply. Thus, the telling question: is it ratio-
nal to hold that there can be veridical mystical states to which the PIP does 
not apply? Alternatively, is it rational to maintain that there can be veridi-
cal mystical states that could not conceivably be phenomenologically iden-
tical to any deceptive mystical states, i.e., veridical mystical states that could 
have no phenomenological imposters? It seems to me that the answer to this 
question is Yes. 
First, however, it should be pointed out that the PIP can readily be con-
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strued as a modal tenet de re: as the postulate that there can be no veridical 
perceptual states to which veridicality was essential. Rather, the PlP 
requires that veridicality (or being veridical) is a property that can be pos-
sessed only accidentally-nonessentially-by perceptual states. (Thus, the 
PIP requires that the conditional property ifveridical then veridical accidentally 
is exemplified by all perceptual states essentially.) Accordingly, while 
there are countless propositions that are true essentially, no perceptual 
states-if the PIP is correct--<:an be veridical essentially. Hence, since it is 
obvious that any veridical mystical state to which veridicality was acciden-
tal could conceivably be a phenomenological imposter, accidental veridicali-
ty rules out transparent veridicality. This being so, no argument on behalf of 
lhe DTV can be plausible if it fails to provide ample justification for the 
view that there can be veridical mystical states to which veridicality was 
essential. For unless we have adequate warrant for maintaining that there 
can be veridical mystical states which lacked phenomenological imposters, 
and, accordingly, veridical mystical states that would not be subject to the 
PlP, it is hard to see just how it could be shown that the DTV is rationally 
respectable. Hence, our very next order of business is to establish that there 
is adequate warrant for holding that there can be veridical mystical states 
to which veridicality was essential: veridical mystical states that could not 
conceivably be phenomenological imposters. Once that is achieved, we 
will be positioned to establish the rational respectability of the DTV. 
lV 
How shall we understand mystical union? What does it consist in? 
Intriguingly, it has been the tendency of many distinguished mystics from 
both the Jewish and Christian traditions to characterize what they take to 
be their episodes of mystical union in metaphysically extreme fashion,12 i.e., 
in ways which-if taken literally-give profound indication of compromis-
ing the canonically central tenet that there is a conceptually unbridgeable 
ontological separateness of Creator from creature. That is, the extreme 
accounts in question maintain or imply-once again, if taken literally-
that, in the throes of mystical union, the relevant finite self is fully absorbed 
within the Limitless Plenitude Who is God in precisely the way that drops 
of water are fully absorbed into the ocean.13 Clearly, this extreme or radical 
conception lends itself remarkably well to the famous characterization of 
authentic mystical union as "undifferentiated unity." 
Intriguingly, what can be seen right off is that, independently of any 
considerations having to do with canonical theism, there is something 
remarkably odd about the "extreme" conception of mystical union. That 
is, there could not conceivably be phenomenological warrant for the view 
that one's self is (literally) annihilated in the course of veridical mystical 
union. Since the existence of the self-i.e., of a finite center of conscious-
ness-clearly constitutes a necessary condition for its ability to detect any-
thing, how could it be conceptually possible for an obliterated self to detect 
"its" nonexistence? However, our distinguished Catholic mystics intro-
duce important qualifications which make it clear that their heightened 
language in this regard is somewhat hyperbolic, i.e., is not to be taken lit-
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erally. Ruysbroeck puts it this way:'4 
... no created essence can become one with God's essence and pass 
away from its own substance. For so the creature would become 
God, which is impossible; for the Divine Essence can neither wax nor 
wane nor can anything be added to It nor taken from It. 
According to Saint John of the Cross,15 what actually takes place in cases of 
veridical mystical union can properly and fruitfully be compared to what 
occurs when a ray of sunlight strikes a window that is "wholly pure and 
clean:" In such a case, 
the ray of sunlight will transform it and illumine it in such wise that 
it will itself seem to be a ray .. .in reality the window has a nature dis-
tinct from that of the ray itself ... yet we may say that that window is a 
ray of the sun or is light by participation. 
Likewise, in the case of mystical union, the relevant pure or stain-free 
receptive soul 
.. .is at once illumined and transformed in God and communicates to 
it His supernatural Being, in such wise that. .. the soul seems to be 
God rather than a soul, and is indeed God by participation; although it 
is true that its natural being, though thus transformed, is as distinct 
from the Being of God as it was before ... '6 
Finally, here is Merton's rendition of this point: '7 
... a contingent and finite substance can never become one nature and 
substance with the infinite and Absolute Being of God ... the meta-
physical impossibility of this is evident from the very notion of a 
substance being "changed into" what is, by nature, unchanging. We 
cannot "become God." God is, and His Being is infinitely above all 
becoming. But by His free gift He can make us participate by knowl-
edge and love in everything that is His by nature. 
It seems to me that this notion, stressed by both John of the Cross and 
Thomas Merton, of unifying with God by participation, is very significant. 
Indeed, it is nothing less than key to the view of mystical union that we 
will go on to elaborate and defend: namely, the conception of mystical 
union as cognitive participation. Now in suggesting that mystical union can 
reasonably be analyzed in this manner, I am contending that, in any actual 
cases of mystical union, the relevant "mystics" -by virtue of God's Power 
and Grace-would be treated (to the fullest extent conceptually possible 
for a finite or created self) to a taste of God's omniscient cognition of the 
whole of things. Further, it seems that this conception of mystical union as 
participation-in-Divine-Cognition explains very well-and it is this in which 
its rational respectability consists-the strong and long-standing tendency 
of many distinguished theistic mystics-no less than of their Eastern and 
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more "pantheistic" counterparts-to maintain that undifferentiated unity 
constitutes the conspicuous phenomenological feature of their most spiri-
tually telling mystical states. Let us, then, proceed to flesh-out what I take 
to be this very important notion of cognitive participation. 
v 
As William James observes,18 
It is a commonplace of metaphysics that God's knowledge cannot be 
discursive but must be intuitive, that is, must be constructed more 
after the pattern of what in ourselves is called immediate feeling, 
than after that of proposition and judgment. 
Why is this so? Well, it can readily be seen to constitute an epistemolog-
ical ramification of the canonical doctrine that the Divine Nature must be 
entirely noncomposite,19 i.e., God's perfect simplicity dictates that His 
knowledge cannot be partitioned in any way.20 Accordingly, God must 
know all that there is to know by one grand comprehensive and seamless 
(or unparsed) intuition. Thus, any distinction drawn between His attribut-
es and His essence must be entirely nominal: it could hardly constitute a real 
distinction. Thus Mairnonides: " ... His knowledge is His essence, and His 
essence is His knowledge."21 Aquinas agrees completely: " ... His act of 
understanding must be His essence and His being."22 Moreover, as 
Aquinas goes on to state,23 
... the species of the divine intellect, which is God's essence, suffices 
to manifest all things. Hence, by understanding His essence, God 
knows the essences of all things, and whatever can be added to them. 
Hence, since God's perfect simplicity requires, as pointed out above by 
Maimonides and Aquinas, that there can be no real distinction between His 
knowledge and His essence, God's knowledge could not fail to have the 
undifferentiated unity of His essence. 
Accordingly, we need hardly resort to the extreme conception of "mysti-
cal union" -that of complete ontological dissolution of the relevant finite 
self into the Limitless Plenitiude Who is God-to account for the pro-
found or overwhelming sense of "undifferentiated unity" reported by so 
many theistic mystics as the conspicuous feature of their unitive mystical 
states. Indeed, we have seen (in part IV) that the extreme conception gives 
very serious indication of being theistically and phenomenologically 
unacceptable. Rather, the profound sense of "undifferentiated unity" 
reported by theistic mystics is very well accounted for by our conception 
of mystical union as participation-in-Divine-Cognition, i.e., it is precisely 
what one would expect if mystical union is analyzable in this way. In pre-
cisely this regard, it seems to me that there is remarkable insight in the fol-
lowing passage from Philip H. Wicksteed's book The Religion of Time and 
the Religion of Eternity:24 
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For the medieval saint believed that to see God is to see as God sees, 
and that just in so far as we rise into true communion with him and 
do in truth see God, so far shall we see things not in their fragmen-
tary imperfections, but in their combined perfectedness ... thus when 
the supreme vision is granted to Dante, and he lifts his mortal eyes to 
look into the light of God, he sees all things .. . as a single perfect whole. 
We are now positioned to appreciate that there could be no veridical state 
of mystical union (interpreted, of course, as seeing as God sees) that would 
fail to be veridical essentially. Accordingly, no veridical state of mystical 
union could possibly have a phenomenological imposter. It is not terribly diffi-
cult to ascertain exactly why this is so. 
VI 
Our fundamental argument here is as follows: (1) Any veridical state of 
mystical union (or seeing as God sees) would be one in which the relevant 
mystic was elevated to-treated by God to-what can be called an optimal-
ly veridical apprehension of the domain of Nature or Creation.25 (2) No opti-
mally veridical apprehension of the domain of Nature or Creation, could 
fail to be veridical essentially. Conclusion: No veridical state of mystical 
union could possibly have a phenomenological imposter. Clearly, these 
premises require justification. Let us begin, appropriately, with premise (1). 
Since it is unproblematic that God is a perfect Knower and perfect 
Observer, it is very hard to see how there could possibly be a more accurate 
view of Creation than the God's-eye view of Creation. Alternatively, how 
could there fail to be less than ideal or strict congruence between the onto-
logically ultimate character of the cosmos and the way in which the cosmos 
is apprehended by God? However, since His perfect simplicity-which, of 
course, is a specification or expression of His overall perfection--ciictates 
that God sees all of Creation as a single or unified Object, it is very hard to 
see how could it fail to be the case that-in the final analysis-Creation 
actually constitutes a single or unified Object. 
Thus, traditional theists have serious warrant for subscribing to what 
can be called Minimal Ontological Pluralism (MOP). According to MOP, 
there are ultimately just two (concrete) objects: One that (or Who) is 
Limitless in all respects and the finite or dependent object that is the cos-
mos or domain of Creation. And, of course, it is central to traditional the-
ism that this latter object owes its existence and perdurance to the former 
object. (Intriguingly, a number of distinguished philosophical theists from 
centuries past have subscribed to MOP, or at least to something very close 
to it-though not, presumably, for the reasons being urged here. The 
important Jewish medieval philosopher Gersonides maintains that " ... the 
world as a whole constitutes one individual."26 And Leibniz, remarkably-
since we tend to think of him as our pluralist par excellence on the issue of 
substance by virtue of his Monadology·-states the following:27 
.. .it must be known that all things are connected in each of the possible 
worlds: the universe, what ever it may be, is all of a piece, like an ocean.) 
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Now it should be clear that MOP does not require the nonexistence of vari-
ety or plurality in the domain of Creation. Rather, there are clearly diverse 
aspects or modifications (e.g., planets, trees, persons) of the single object that 
is the cosmos. These aspects or modifications exist, of course (wrinkles in 
carpets are not illusions), but not as objects in their own right: not, strictly 
speaking, as proper parts of the cosmos. 
An analogy to moderate scientific realism may be helpful here. 
According to the latter, what is ontologically basic or ultimately real are the 
micro-particles postulated by contemporary physical theory. This should 
not, however, be taken to imply that the macroscopic objects of ordinary 
sense-perception constitute illusions. Rather, moderate scientific realism (in 
contradistinction to the extreme or eliminative version of that doctrine) con-
stitutes a reductive analysis of macroscopic objects. Thus, the latter objects 
can properly be regarded as objects of veridical perception even though what 
is ontologically basic or ultimately real is not macroscopic. Analogously, 
MOP should not be taken to imply that the seemingly obvious diversity or 
plurality in the domain of Creation is illusory. Rather, what is implied by 
MOP is that this diversity or plurality ultimately reduces to the qualitatively 
and numerically unified object that is the cosmos. 
Thus, the central point: since the God's-eye view of the domain of 
Creation could not fail to constitute an optimally veridical apprehension of 
that domain (of the cosmos), to be in a mystical state that consists in seeing 
as God sees would be to participate in an optimally veridical apprehension 
of the domain of Creation. 
On, now, to our justification for that important second premise of the 
argument spelled out at the beginning of this section. Why should it be 
held that any case of seeing as God sees-any optimally veridical apprehen-
sion of the domain of Creation-would have to be veridical essentially, i.e., 
could not conceivably have a phenomenological imposter? Well, consider: 
since any optimally veridical apprehension of God's Creation (or the cos-
mos) can take place only by virtue of the relevant mystic's participating in, 
or being in epistemic alignment with, God's apprehension of the domain of 
Creation, the notion that such an optically veridical apprehension could 
conceivably be veridical accidentally-could conceivably have a phenome-
nological imposter-has a patently absurd entailment. That is, since God's 
optimally veridical monistic grasp of all things takes place by virtue of His 
perfectly simple intuition of His Essence, His simple grasp of the Whole of 
Creation could be veridical accidentally only if there is a possible world at 
which God's "simple grasp of His Essence" and thus "His simple grasp of 
the Whole of Creation" is deceptive, but has precisely the qualitative nature 
of what is in fact His veridical simple apprehension of His Essence, and, 
accordingly, of the Whole of Creation. Clearly, however, there is no such 
possible world. It is conceptually impossible for a necessarily perfect Being, 
hence a necessarily perfect Knower, to have any deceptive apprehensions at 
all. Accordingly, God's optimally veridical grasp of the domain of Creation 
could not fail to be veridical essentially, and, accordingly, could not possi-
bly have a phenomenological imposter. Thus, it seems clear that premise (2) of 
the argument set forth at the beginning of this section has been secured. 
Therefore: any veridical state of mystical union (as interpreted and defend-
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ed), i.e., any optimally veridical apprehension of the domain of Creation-
or seeing as God sees-could not fail to be veridical essentially: could not 
possibly have a phenomenological imposter. 
Now it is important for the following to be clear: nothing that has been 
argued even begins to imply that there cannot be deceptive states of "mysti-
cal union." There can indeed be such states, and it seems eminently plausi-
ble to maintain that there have been-and will continue to be-deceptive 
states of that sort, i.e., mystical perceptions that seem to their phenomeno-
logical subjects to constitute bona fide states of mystical union, but in fact 
are deceptive. Surely, however, this hardly vititates the point that there can 
be veridical states of mystical union to which veridicality was essential. The 
crucial finding, then, is this: no veridical state of mystical union--{)r so it is 
rationally respectable to believ~ould conceivably be phenomenologically 
identical to any deceptive state of "mystical union." Alternatively, no decep-
tive state of "mystical union" could possibly be a phenomenological imposter 
of any veridical state of mystical union. 
So: there is ample warrant for maintaining that the PIP, by virtue of 
entailing that there cannot be veridical perceptual states (sensory or mysti-
cal) to which veridical was essential, deserves to be rejected as a postulate 
that is universally applicable to perceptual states. It may, of course, be the 
case that the PIP is applicable to perceptual states in general-to the vast 
majority of perceptual states. Indeed, our argument would not be vitiated 
in the least even if (as hardly seems implaUSible) the PIP is applicable to all 
sensory states (a view on which I have taken no position in this essay). 
VII 
The task remaining, then, is to establish that our overall argumentation 
heretofore (assuming its success) suffices to ensure the rational respectabil-
ity of the Doctrine of Transparent Veridicality (the DTV). What is the warrant 
for the transition from essential veridicality to transparent veridicality? Why 
is it proper to hold that the veridicality of any perceptual state to which 
veridicality was essential--{)f any perceptual state that could not possibly be 
deceptive-would be immediately apparent to its phenomenological subject? 
Well, consider: for the remarkably vast number of veridical perceptual 
states the veridicality of which is "garden-variety" or accidental, the veridi-
cality of such states is clearly extra-phenomenological. Alternatively, since 
veridical perceptual states that are veridical accidentally could conceivably 
have been phenomenological imposters, no accidentally veridical percep-
tual state could be such that its veridicality was partially constitutive of its 
phenomenological content. However, any veridical perceptual state to 
which veridicality was essential could not fail to be radically different in this 
regard: how could the veridicality of any perceptual state that could not 
conceivably have been a phenomenological imposter fail to be intra-phe-
nomenological? 
Consider for the moment true propositions that are true accidentally (i.e., 
contingently true propositions). Clearly, the truth of such propositions is 
extra-propositional, i.e., the truth of any such proposition clearly fails to be 
partially constitutive of it. However, this could hardly be the case regarding 
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true propositions that are true essentially, e.g., Triangles have fewer sides than 
squares. Since no false proposition could conceivably be identical to it, it is 
hard to see how its truth could possibly fail to be intra-propositional, and, 
accordingly, partially constitutive of that proposition. Hence, just as truth is 
partially constitutive of any proposition to which it is essential, why is it not 
tenable to maintain that veridicality would be partially constitutive of any 
perceptual state to which it was essential? However, it seems clear that ratio-
nal and attentive phenomenological subjects are immediately aware of 
every feature that their respective perceptual states incorporate. For exam-
ple, suppose that John is seeing the full moon. Accordingly, the phenome-
nological content of his perceptual state is made up (chiefly if not exhaus-
tively) of whiteness, roundness, and luminosity. Surely, there is something 
very odd about the claim that, while John is immediately aware of (say) 
roundness and luminosity, he is simply unaware of whiteness. If it should 
happen that John has no awareness of whiteness, the proper inference is 
not that there is a component of his phenomenological content of which he 
is unaware, but, rather, that whiteness is not a component of his phenome-
nological content. Thus, there is ample justification for holding that any 
perceptual state which enjoyed the distinction of being veridical essentially 
would be such that its phenomenological subject would be immediately 
aware of its veridicality, i.e., such that its veridicality would be transparent 
to its phenomenological subject. 
Thus, we can end just where we began: with the remarkable observation 
from Thomas Merton that nothing other than God 
can produce even a plausible imitation of true mystical union ... any-
one who has experienced true mystical union can see at once the infi-
nite distance that lies between it and the false article ... Why should it 
not be held that what Merton has urged here, and, accordingly, the 
DTV, is rationally respectable? 
EPILOGUE 
Our argument in no way suggests that persons other than the relevant mys-
tics have an obligation of some sort to accept the mystical states in question 
as veridical-let alone as transparently veridical by virtue of being veridical 
essentially. However, what has usually been alleged by the many opponents 
of the DTV is the much stronger claim that the relevant mystics themselves 
are not entitled to regard their mystical-union states as "authoritative in an 
objective sense" (as per Mackie, end-note #4). If our argument has succeed-
ed, however, this time-honored allegation is very questionable indeed. 
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